Research · HyperEVM · chain 999

Papertrade Dossier

A perp exchange on HyperEVM with up to 1000x leverage, where losers earn the PAPER token and winners wait in a payout queue. This page collects everything: how it works, why it took off, what an on-chain review of the contracts showed, and what it means for a $50k farming deposit.

Snapshot date: Oct 16, 2026 HyperEVM block: 48,693,388 Site: papertrade.xyz Scripts: papertrade-research\scripts\

Review summary

Deposits can't be taken instantly

Upgrades and every admin function go through a 7-day Timelock. Simulation found no bypass.

Funds are backed to the dollar

Liabilities are $67,847,624, and $67,847,625 sits on HyperCore. The payout queue is empty.

You can exit without their relayer

withdrawToCore has no caller restriction, and anyone can submit withdrawToCoreBySig.

From Oct 19 the delay drops to 1 day

updateMinDelay(86400) is queued in the Timelock and executable from Oct 19, 22:01 UTC.

No source code anywhere

The contracts are unverified on the explorer, no audit is published, and there is no official GitHub repository.

The oracle is still vulnerable

The price is a single Hyperliquid BBO midpoint with no TWAP and no deviation check. This hits the pool, not user balances.

01What it is and why it's popular

Papertrade is a synthetic perp exchange on HyperEVM, Hyperliquid's EVM layer. It has no order book, no matching engine and no oracle of its own. The protocol's pool takes the other side of every trade, and the contract reads prices straight from Hyperliquid's order book. According to the founder, two or three people built it. It lists two markets: BTC and ETH.

It looks like it was built in a day, and technically that's close to the truth: there is very little to build. What's being sold is the mechanism, not the engineering.

Why it took off

  • "You get paid for losing." PAPER is minted only from losses and liquidations. Win and you take the profit; lose and you get tokens.
  • Casino settings. Up to 1000x leverage, no trading fee, no funding, "no slippage".
  • The "next HYPE" narrative. Supply starts at zero: no team or VC allocation, no airdrop, no vesting.
  • FOMO built into emissions. While the pool is under $2M, every $1 lost earns 100 PAPER, and the rate falls after that. Early users get several times more.
  • Credibility and marketing. Media identify co-founder Jez as Colin Hong (MIT, Morgan Stanley, Standard Crypto). The launch video passed 1M views on X.
$85–138M
pre-launch deposits, 11k+ addresses
$14.4B
volume in the first 10 minutes
$3.3B → $0.4B
OI: peak vs. evening of Oct 12 (−88%)
$20.3M → $5M
margin in open positions

Volume and OI are inflated by leverage: at 1000x, billions in notional rest on small deposits. A large share of the volume is farming with paired positions.

02Timeline

  1. Closed beta. The project hires Guardian Audits; no report has been published since.
  2. Launch video, over 1M views.
  3. Deposits open.
  4. Trading starts. $14.4B in volume within 10 minutes; BTC OI $3B, ETH $2.66B.
  5. One wallet takes about $1.28M by moving Hyperliquid's ETH BBO.
  6. The team acknowledges the manipulation and cuts OI caps in the contract and at the relayer.
  7. The multisig queues a Timelock change cutting the delay from 7 days to 1 day.
  8. Emissions fall to 16.6 PAPER per $1. This review is carried out.
  9. setMintParams executes: the staker cap rises from $5M to $10M.
  10. updateMinDelay(86400) becomes executable. After that, any change, including an upgrade, needs only 24 hours' notice.

03Mechanics

Where the price comes from

The PriceOracle contract reads Hyperliquid's best bid and ask through the system precompile 0x…080e and takes the midpoint. That is the entry and exit price. There is no TWAP, no median and no deviation check. The precompile returns HyperCore's state as of the moment the HyperEVM block is built, so you get the price of the block your transaction lands in.

The relayer

The relayer is an off-chain service run by the team. It takes signed orders and submits them to the BatchExecutor, paying the gas. It doesn't set prices, but it decides when and in what order a trade lands in a block. Liquidations go first, then closes, then opens, with large trades ahead of small ones. Opening positions, registering session keys and staking only work through the relayer. Withdrawals work without it.

The winners' queue

Winnings are paid only out of other traders' losses. If the pool is empty, unpaid profit joins a FIFO queue and waits for future losers. Winners get their margin back immediately. As of Oct 16 the queue is empty.

Fees and haircut

There is no trading fee and no funding. Winnings pay three things: a 0.2 bp deadband, an asymmetric haircut (larger on small moves) and a 2% win fee. On a losing close, the 2% is paid by the pool, not the trader. Share of a BTC win you keep at launch parameters:

BTC moveRaw profit on $100kYou keep
0.05%$5060.7%
0.1%$10072.4%
0.2%$20079.7%
0.5%$50084.6%
1%$1,00086.4%
2%$2,00087.3%
5%$5,00087.8%

Liquidations

Margin is isolated. You can't add margin, change leverage or partially close. Liquidation fires about 5 bp before the margin runs out: at 1000x, after a move of roughly 0.052%. The whole margin is lost, even though a manual close would have returned about half.

04The October 10 manipulation

One wallet held 30 ETH shorts of about $9.9M each at 660x leverage, roughly $297M in notional. The $10M cap applied per position, not per wallet. At the same time the wallet moved the top of Hyperliquid's ETH book: it bought about 6,060 ETH (price up about $3), then sold about 5,210 ETH (down about $3.50). The result was about $1.28M in profit within a few hours.

  • Moving a single quote for a single block was enough; there was no need to hold the price.
  • At 1000x, even a fraction of a percent pays well: roughly 0.1% of $297M ≈ $300k.
  • Hyperliquid itself wasn't hacked. The weakness is in how Papertrade uses its quote.

After the incident the team added the deadband, impact haircut and win fee, and cut OI caps. There is still no deviation check on the quote. The team said the funds were almost entirely returned through new accounts. The Block could not confirm this.

05The PAPER token

100 → 16.6
PAPER per $1 lost (launch → Oct 16)
8.16B
supply, 99.2% staked
~$1.56M/day
latest known staker income
~$0.064
implied price of 1 PAPER via PSTR market cap
  • Emissions. 100 PAPER per $1 while the tracked pool is under $2M. After that the rate decays along a high-watermark curve: about 30.8 by Oct 12, 16.6 by Oct 16.
  • Staker income is paid in USDC. Half of the 2% fee plus everything in the pool above the cap. The cap is $5M now and rises to $10M on Oct 17. Until the pool gains another ~$5M, staker income will be close to zero.
  • Transfers are disabled. PAPER can only be staked and has no market price. Supply is projected to reach 14–18B.
  • Contract roles. The minter can burn PAPER from any address, and a privileged spender has an unlimited allowance over everyone's PAPER. On-chain these are PaperTokenomics and PaperStaking, both behind the Timelock.

The $5.06M daily average is heavily inflated by the first day, which brought in $24M. Today 1M PAPER earns about $190 a day, and the PAPER earned from $1 of losses earns about $0.003 a day.

06Delta-neutral farming

The idea: open a position on Papertrade and hedge it on Hyperliquid. The loss on Papertrade earns PAPER, and the hedge's gain offsets it. Hyperliquid works better than other venues because that's where the price comes from. The real cost of the strategy is Hyperliquid fees, funding and execution mismatch.

Costs with a taker round-trip fee of $90 per $100k notional and emissions of 16.6 PAPER per $1:

Move against the Papertrade legCost per $1 lostCost per 1 PAPER
0.3%$0.30~$0.018
0.5%$0.18~$0.011
1%$0.09~$0.0055
2%$0.045~$0.0027

Funding adds to the cost the longer you hold. Maker orders on Hyperliquid cut costs roughly threefold but add fill risk.

Pitfalls

  • Leverage. No more than 100x: liquidation takes the whole margin while the hedge recovers only half. Aim to close manually after a 0.5–1.5% move.
  • The price moves in your favor. Don't close: the profit gets a haircut and you get no tokens. You have to wait for a reversal and pay funding.
  • The relayer. Small trades wait, so the two legs can close at different prices.
  • Yield. On Oct 17 the staker cap doubles, and income may drop close to zero for a while.
  • The token. PAPER can't be sold. While the pool is above the cap, the dollar you lose is shared among all stakers, mostly early farmers.

07On-chain contract review

The addresses come from the official docs and were checked through the HyperEVM RPC (rpc.hyperliquid.xyz/evm) and the HyperCore API. Method: reading EIP-1967 proxy slots, calling view functions, simulating calls from different addresses with eth_call, and extracting function selectors from the bytecode.

Who controls it

2-of-3 multisigcustom, not Safe · 3 EOA signers
TimelockminDelay 604,800 s = 7 days
ProxyAdmin0xe79c…0f8f
8 protocol proxiesExchange, Oracle, Token, Staking…

The Timelock is also the owner() of every implementation. The multisig doubles as pause guardian: it can halt opens or retire a market, but only the Timelock can lift a global pause.

Attempts to bypass the Timelock (simulation)

CallCallerResult
Timelock.updateMinDelay(0)Multisigrejected NotSelf()
Timelock.updateMinDelay(0)The Timelock itselfpasses only via the queue
Multisig.updateSigners(…)A single signerrejected NotSelf()
ProxyAdmin.upgrade(Exchange, …)Multisigrejected NotOwner()
ProxyAdmin.upgrade(Exchange, …)Timelockpasses after 7 days
setAuthorizedExecutor, setProxyFactory, setSessionKeyManager, setPaperTokenomics, changeDevFeeAddress, transferOwnershipMultisigrejected NotOwner()
setTradingPaused(false)Multisig (guardian)rejected NotPauseAuthority()
sweep(addr)Anyone, Timelockrejected NoProxy()
claimDevFees()Anyonerejected NotDevFeeRecipient()

Exchange solvency

Item (on-chain)USDC
Free user balances (totalBalances)50,683,091
Margin in open positions (totalLockedMargin)12,167,244
Payout queue (totalQueued)0
LP pool (lpBankrollAvailable)4,995,980
Accrued staker and dev fees1,309
Total liabilities67,847,624
Actual USDC in the Exchange's HyperCore account67,847,625

Timelock queue and multisig transactions

#What it doesStatus
tx0Sets the three signersexecuted
tx1PaperTokenomics.setMintParams: $2M threshold, $10M staker cap, rate 100in Timelock ready Oct 17, 18:46 UTC
tx2Batch change of BTC and ETH market parameters in Exchangenot in Timelock
tx3Timelock.updateMinDelay(86400): delay 7 days → 1 dayin Timelock ready Oct 19, 22:01 UTC
tx4Change of ETH market parameters in Exchangenot in Timelock
tx5Transfer of 84,366 USDC from the multisig to 0x2d30…a274executed
tx6Transfer of 16,383 USDC from the multisig to 0x98f1…6d93executed

The multisig also holds about $144k of the team's USDC. User funds are not there; they sit in the Exchange's HyperCore account.

Roles in Exchange

RoleAddressWhat it can do
ownerTimelock 0xB915…EA0FEverything, including upgrading the implementation
pauseGuardianMultisig 0x6962…d1F6Halt opens, retire a market
marketKeeperEOA 0x3721…cf99OI caps and trade minimums; can't move collateral
authorizedExecutorBatchExecutor 0x233F…626ESubmit intents signed by users
devFeeRecipientEOA 0xeef6…5792Claim dev fees

Withdrawals

The bytecode includes withdrawToCore(uint256). Simulating it from an arbitrary address and from the BatchExecutor returned the same errors: "zero amount" and "no balance". So there's no caller restriction, and you can withdraw straight from your own wallet.

There is also withdrawToCoreBySig(user, amount, nonce, deadline, v, r, s): you sign a message and anyone can submit it. This isn't a hole. There's no recipient parameter, so funds go to the signer's own HyperCore account, and the nonce and deadline stop the signature from being reused. If the relayer starts censoring, any other wallet can submit the signature.

Addresses

ContractAddress
Exchange0x6cd5661646289FB6E65EA5C032310fDEd797D0a2
BatchExecutor0x233Ff29b239abc1D7748605dA9b205C3e008626E
PriceOracle0xa9B4c7b7Ca5835652d81E25739c870D49F39cC2e
SessionKeyManager0x8326Eb8896e358717f10502Ec73CE8D28E37B108
DepositProxyFactory0x1629b7D46bef6E13FF754174FC9F32dEa309b38F
PaperToken0xe40f17915DAa230324030003A197cdAEf2261C0e
PaperStaking0xAAd6c7b0CC3014FC80FfEDAe0Ed7Ce5967b0F016
PaperTokenomics0x75174549dbBD44497D31a47E2E2D7406408d63D9
Timelock0xB915Fa41e824D6aA31BB833Ee81220C0F2c8EA0F
Multisig0x696292762fD5AC3677a45EdBe54EAECE4194d1F6
ProxyAdmin0xe79c91cc682f1bb401a9cab74c900470190f0f8f
USDC (collateral)0xb88339CB7199b77E23DB6E890353E22632Ba630f
Multisig signers0xaa75…a88e · 0xe968…692e · 0x9028…1e72

08GitHub

There is no official Papertrade source code on GitHub, neither a current nor an older version. Neither the docs nor the site link to GitHub.

aa-matthew/papertrade-contract-research third-party

A reverse-engineering study of the deployed contracts, dated Oct 15. The author states: "Original Papertrade Solidity remains unavailable". The useful part is the ABIs pulled from the official frontend: they confirmed withdrawToCoreBySig, setMintParams and unpauseMarket.

The other repositories from the past week are also third-party: farming bots, SDKs, dashboards and a clone of the project on another network.

Mismatch with the docs. The docs say retiring a market is irreversible, yet unpauseMarket(uint32) exists in both the frontend ABI and the bytecode. Whether it works couldn't be tested, because no market is currently retired.

09Outlook

Rug within a week unlikely

The team does better by keeping it running: dev fees are already about $1.77M. The co-founder is public. The mechanism can't go bankrupt, and withdrawals don't depend on the relayer.

Hack within 1–2 weeks real risk

More likely economic than a code bug: another oracle manipulation, a HyperEVM/HyperCore desync or relayer timing games. Such an attack hits the pool, not deposits.

Gradual fade most likely

Emissions keep falling, and farmers will leave once PAPER costs more to farm than it's worth. Once transfers open, token dumping begins. If the pool drops below $2M, the rate returns to 100 and a second wave is possible.

10What wasn't verified

  • Logic inside the implementations: there's no source, only bytecode and function names. Hidden behavior can't be ruled out.
  • A withdrawal by a real user with a balance: the RPC returns logs only in 1,000-block ranges, so no funded addresses could be found.
  • Whether unpauseMarket works after a market is retired.
  • Who holds the multisig signer keys, and whether they belong to one person.
  • Whether a signed order carries a worst-price limit.
  • Emissions, staker income and volume figures come from media and dashboards. Only balances, roles, the Timelock queue and the setMintParams parameters were checked on-chain.

11Security and risk summary

Risks are ranked by what they mean for a farming deposit. Likelihood is an estimate for the coming weeks based on the data gathered, not a precise calculation.

RiskLikelihoodWhat you loseHow to protect yourself
Farming economics: liquidations, hedge legs drifting apart, funding, rising costs as emissions fallhighPart of the margin, plus costs on every cycleLeverage up to 50–100x, manual closes, hedge on Hyperliquid, track every cycle
PAPER losing value: no liquidity, dilution to 14–18B, lower staker income after Oct 17highExpected farming income, not the depositTreat PAPER as a lottery ticket. Stop farming when the token costs more to farm than its market estimate
Hidden logic or a bug in unverified codeunknownUp to the entire deposit on PapertradeKeep only the current cycle's margin there and withdraw regularly
Oracle manipulation (BBO)mediumThe protocol pool, not your balance. Indirectly: the payout queue and staker incomeDon't hold winning positions while waiting for a payout; watch the queue
Session key theft or phishingmediumYour balance, through forced trades. The key can't withdrawrevokeSessionKey between sessions; sign only on papertrade.xyz
Malicious upgrade by the teamlowThe entire deposit on Papertrade7 days to react now, only 24 hours from Oct 19. Check the Timelock queue daily
Compromise of 2 of 3 multisig keyslowThe entire deposit, but only after the Timelock delayThe same Timelock monitoring
Parameter changes: emission curve, fees, capsalready happeningFarming yieldOperations appear in the Timelock in advance; factor them in
Relayer censorshiplowThe ability to trade, not your fundsDirect withdrawToCore from your wallet; keep a little HYPE for gas

Verdict

protected

Against an instant rug through the contracts. User funds are fully backed, and exiting doesn't depend on the team.

relies on trust

The code is closed, there's no audit, and the multisig is custom. From Oct 19, protection comes down to 24 hours' notice.

main risk

The main threat is economics, not a hack. Farming costs keep rising, PAPER can't be sold, and its income depends on new losers.

Bottom line. The contracts allow you to go in, but only with a small part of the amount and a daily Timelock check after Oct 19. Of the $50k, only one cycle's margin should sit on Papertrade; keep the rest on Hyperliquid for the hedge. Start with a $10–20 test withdrawal. Farming income is a bet on a token with no market, so don't plan on it as guaranteed.

12Sources